{"id":10964,"date":"2026-06-15T19:55:26","date_gmt":"2026-06-15T19:55:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/u-s-supreme-court-clarifies-procedures-for-federal-employment-discrimination-law-claims\/"},"modified":"2026-06-15T19:55:26","modified_gmt":"2026-06-15T19:55:26","slug":"u-s-supreme-court-clarifies-procedures-for-federal-employment-discrimination-law-claims","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/u-s-supreme-court-clarifies-procedures-for-federal-employment-discrimination-law-claims\/","title":{"rendered":"U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Procedures for Federal Employment Discrimination Law Claims"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n

Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n

In Fort Bend County <\/em>v. Davis<\/em>, a unanimous Supreme Court held that Title VII\u2019s requirement that a claimant file an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the \u201cEEOC\u201d) or comparable state or local agency prior to filing a lawsuit is a \u201cclaim-processing rule[] that must be timely raised\u201d by a defendant rather than a \u201cjurisdictional requirement\u201d that can be raised at any time during the proceeding, and therefore is subject to waiver.\u00a0 This decision resolved a split in the circuit courts of appeals.\u00a0 As a result of this decision, employers must object to an employee\u2019s failure to exhaust the administrative process in a timely manner or else the defense will be waived notwithstanding the employee\u2019s failure to comply with Title VII\u2019s administrative requirements.
\u00a0 <\/p>\n

Background<\/strong><\/p>\n

Title VII requires that an employee seeking to bring a discrimination suit in federal court first file a charge with the EEOC or a comparable state or local agency within 180 days \u201cafter the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.\u201d\u00a0 After receiving a charge, the EEOC must notify the employer and investigate.\u00a0 The EEOC must \u201cendeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.\u201d\u00a0 The EEOC can commence a civil action against the employer if it believes there has been a violation of law.\u00a0 If, however, the EEOC finds that there is \u201cn[o] reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,\u201d then it must dismiss the charge and give the complainant notice of right to sue.\u00a0 The EEOC must provide the complainant with this \u201cright-to-sue\u201d notice within 180 days from the date the charge is filed.\u00a0 A complainant may file a civil case against the employer within 90 days of receiving the \u201cright-to-sue\u201d notice.
\u00a0 <\/p>\n

Proceedings Below<\/strong><\/p>\n

Lois Davis worked for Fort Bend County in information technology.\u00a0 In 2010, she complained to the human resources department that the information technology director was sexually harassing her.\u00a0 The director resigned following an investigation.\u00a0 Davis alleges that her supervisor\u2014who was \u201cwell acquainted\u201d with the director who resigned\u2014retaliated against her for reporting the sexual harassment by, among other things, reducing her job responsibilities.\u00a0 In 2011, Davis submitted an \u201cintake questionnaire\u201d followed by a formal charge to the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.\u00a0 While the charge was pending, the supervisor allegedly informed Davis that she was required to work on Sunday, a day on which she had a church obligation, or face termination.\u00a0 Davis allegedly went to church and her employment was subsequently terminated.\u00a0 Davis attempted to add religious discrimination to her charge by handwriting \u201creligion\u201d on the intake questionnaire but did not change the formal charge document.\u00a0 A few months later, she received her \u201cright-to-sue\u201d notice.<\/p>\n

In 2012, Davis filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas alleging retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII.\u00a0 The district court granted Fort Bend\u2019s motion for summary judgment in 2013, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as to Davis\u2019s religious discrimination claim.\u00a0 Only then, after four years of litigation, did Fort Bend County argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Davis\u2019s claims because she failed to state her religious discrimination claim in her administrative charge based on her failure to add the claim to the formal charge document.<\/p>\n

The district court held that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, which therefore cannot be forfeited, and that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the exhaustion requirement is a \u201cprudential prerequisite\u201d to suit rather than a jurisdictional requirement, and that Fort Bend County had forfeited its right to bring this assertion due to its four-year delay.<\/p>\n

The decision contributed to a split among the courts of appeals over whether Title VII\u2019s charge-filing requirement is jurisdictional.\u00a0 Eight circuit courts, the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, had held that the requirement is nonjurisdictional, and three circuit courts, the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, had held that the requirement is jurisdictional.
\u00a0 <\/p>\n

The Supreme Court\u2019s Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that \u201cTitle VII\u2019s charge-filing instruction is not jurisdictional\u201d and that \u201dprerequisites to suit like Title VII\u2019s charge-filing instruction\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0are properly ranked among the array of claim-processing rules that must be timely raised to come into play.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

The Court observed that the word \u201cjurisdictional\u201d is \u201cgenerally reserved for describing the classes of cases a court may consider (subject matter jurisdiction) and the persons over whom the court may exercise adjudicatory authority (personal jurisdiction).\u201d\u00a0 The Court explained that rules may be jurisdictional if Congress \u201cincorporat[es] them into a jurisdictional provision\u201d\u2014such as a provision providing that \u201c[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u201d\u2014or if \u201ca long line of Supreme Court decisions left undisturbed by Congress attache[s] a jurisdictional label to the prescription.\u201d\u00a0 The Court emphasized that jurisdictional arguments are \u201cunique\u201d and may \u201cwast[e] court resources and disturbingly disarm litigations\u201d when \u201ctardy.\u201d\u00a0 The Court then identified a number of nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules that it considered comparable to the Title VII claim-processing rule and that are subject to waiver, including preconditions under the Copyright Act, the Railway Labor Act, and the Clean Air Act.\u00a0 The Court found that, although Congress need not use \u201cmagic words\u201d to render a provision jurisdictional, the Court will \u201cleave the ball in Congress\u2019 court\u201d and will find that \u201cwhen Congress does not rank a [prescription] as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.\u201d<\/p>\n

In this case, the Court held that Title VII\u2019s charge-filing requirement is \u201cnot of jurisdictional cast.\u201d\u00a0 The Court noted that Title VII has a separate jurisdictional provision and found that Title VII\u2019s charge-filing provisions \u201cdo not speak to a court\u2019s authority\u201d or \u201crefer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.\u201d\u00a0 Rather, the charge-filing provision \u201cspeak[s] to\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0a party\u2019s procedural obligations.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Court rejected Fort Bend County\u2019s argument that the charge-filing requirement is jurisdictional in nature due to the \u201ccongressional purposes embodied in the Title VII scheme,\u201d principally the goals of fostering conciliation and giving the EEOC the opportunity to file suit in the first instance.\u00a0 Rather, the Court explained that the promotion of \u201cimportant congressional objectives\u201d does not confer jurisdictional status on a particular prescription and found that \u201ca rule may be mandatory without being jurisdictional, and Title VII\u2019s charge-filing requirement fits that bill.\u201d
\u00a0 <\/p>\n

Implications<\/strong><\/p>\n

Possible Increased Availability of Federal Forum for Title VII Claims.<\/strong><\/em>\u00a0 Although the Court\u2019s decision arguably could make it easier for employees to bring claims in federal court without exhausting administrative requirements, the Court specifically noted that employees still have \u201cscant incentive to skirt\u201d the charge-filing requirements because employers will \u201chave good reason promptly to raise an objection that may rid them of the lawsuit filed against them.\u201d<\/p>\n

Effect on Employers Seeking Dismissal of Claims.<\/strong><\/em>\u00a0 The decision, by resolving a deep circuit split, provides significant clarity to courts, employers and employees.\u00a0 Upon being served with a complaint, employers should promptly consider whether the employee properly exhausted the administrative requirements and if not must timely assert the defense, or else risk the waiver of it.<\/p>\n

This post is available in another form\u00a0as an S&C\u00a0client memo.<\/em><\/strong>\n <\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Summary In Fort Bend County v. Davis, a unanimous Supreme Court held that Title VII\u2019s requirement that a claimant file an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":10965,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[300,1329,143,349,451,554,153,3804,533,272],"class_list":["post-10964","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-lawyers","tag-claims","tag-clarifies","tag-court","tag-discrimination","tag-employment","tag-federal","tag-law","tag-procedures","tag-supreme","tag-u-s"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10964","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10964"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10964\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10965"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10964"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10964"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/usatrustedlawyers.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10964"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}